Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 52
Issue 2 Seventh Circuit Review

Article 12

October 1975

Deportation as Punishment: Plenary Power Re-Examined
Robert Nolan
Robert Nolan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert Nolan & Robert Nolan, Deportation as Punishment: Plenary Power Re-Examined, 52 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 466 (1975).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol52/iss2/12

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

DEPORTATION AS PUNISHMENT: PLENARY
POWER RE-EXAMINED
Lieggi v. United States Immigrationand NaturalizationService,
389 F.Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill.
1975).
Deportation is an anomaly in an era of judicial concern for the rights
of the individual, for through the use of the deportation power Congress may
arbitrarily decide the grounds on which aliens are to be allowed to remain
in this country, or are to be forced to leave. This decision is routinely made
without judicially-imposed limits on congressional power to define excludable
classes. In Lieggi v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service,'
a recently decided district court case currently on appeal to the Seventh Circuit, a writ of habeas corpus was issued upon the finding that deportation
of the petitioner, an alien, would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Although the trial court was led to issue the writ at least partially by the large
inequity which would result in that particular case, the opinion presents the
Seventh Circuit with an issue of potential impact far beyond the case's limited

facts.
This comment will focus on the district court's holding that deportation
is punishment in any sense of the word, a holding which breaks with precedent by questioning the nature of the deportation power. To this end, the
analysis will state the view of the deportation power held by prior courts and
then detail Lieggi's departure from this view. An historical analysis of the
origins of the power will be offered as possible support for the trial court
decision and for its affirmance on appeal.
THE ALIEN'S RIGHTS AND THE DEPORTATION POWER OF CONGRESS

The rights of a resident alien, while less than those of a citizen, are
significant. The alien is protected by the equal protection and due process
clauses of the fourteenth amendment, the fifth amendment due process
clause,2 the Bill of Rights,3 and generally by all of the guarantees of the Constitution not explicitly limited to "citizens." '4 Although aliens have long been
1. 389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill.
1975), appeal docketed, No. 75 1393, 7th Cir., May
5, 1975.
2. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

3. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252 (1941); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (Petitioner was an alien
who was ordered deported and also to serve sixty days imprisonment. Court held that
criminal due process standards were required only to extent that sentence other than deportation was imposed).
4. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586 (1952).
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discriminated against by statute in the area of property ownership, 5 recent
Supreme Court decisions 6 holding alienage to be a suspect classification for
equal protection purposes have enlarged the social and economic rights of
aliens, and any unequal treatment in these areas today will only be upheld
on a showing of a compelling state interest.
All of the rights and privileges the alien possesses depend on his remaining in this country, however, and in the deportation setting his rights are
minute. Deportation, for the purposes of this discussion, is both the power
of Congress to define expellable classes, and the expulsion procedure itself.
This procedure is administrative, 7 and directed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Upon discovery by that agency that an alien may fall
within an expellable class, 8 an order to show cause and notice of hearing is
issued. The hearing 9 is held before a Special Inquiry Officer and the alien has
a statutory right to privately-retained counsel. 10 If a deportation order is issued, procedures are provided for administrative review, and limited judicial
review by writ of habeas corpus is available after exhaustion of administrative remedies." Although procedural due process, the right to notice and
hearing, is required, 1 2 the courts have refused to hold invalid any ground for
deportation promulgated by Congress. This refusal is based on the view that
the power of Congress to fix expellable classes is plenary, and thus beyond

the reach of judicial review.
Plenary power has been defined as power that is "full, entire, complete,
5. E.g., Illinois allows resident aliens to buy and own real property within the
state, but if the alien has not sold the property, or become naturalized after six years,
provision is made for the state's attorney to sell the property. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 6,
§§ 1-6 (1973).
6. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (State rule limiting admission to the practice of law to citizens found unconstitutional); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973) (Statute limiting employment in civil service jobs to citizens found invalid);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (Requirement that aliens reside in the state
for a period of time before becoming eligible for welfare benefits found improper).
7. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970).
8. The list of expellable classes is extensive, but includes: those who have entered
illegally; those likely to be institutionalized because of a mental disease, defect, or deficiency within five years of entry; anarchists, or those who advocate opposition to all
organized governments; Communist Party members; drug addicts and those who have
violated narcotics laws; managers of houses of prostitution; those who have aided another alien to enter illegally; and possessors of a weapon designed to shoot automatically
or semi-automatically, or a sawed-off shotgun; 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)-(17) (1970).
9. This hearing is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970).
10. In addition to permitting privately retained counsel, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)
(1970) requires reasonable notice of the time and place of the proceedings and an opportunity to examine the evidence against the alien, to present evidence on his own behalf, and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. Also, deportation orders must be
based upon reasonable, substantial and probative evidence.
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1970).
12. Wong Yang Sung v.McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). See also Yamataya v.
Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (Administrative officers inexcluding aliens must act within
the due process clause).
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absolute, perfect, and unqualified."' 3 As has been seen, however, the power
of Congress in the area of deportation is not unqualified, since the courts and
statutes have required that minimal standards of procedural due process be
observed.' 4 Although the courts have long required this modicum of protec-

tion, they have never recognized the concommitant requirement of substantive due process; that is, they have never required a showing of a reasonable

basis for the exercise of the deportation power. This would seem illogical,
since neither the fifth nor the fourteenth amendment contains different standards for the imposition of the two concepts.' 5 This dichotomy can be par-

tially explained by an historical analysis of prior cases and statutes on which
the plenary status of the deportation power has been based.

Upon close

examination, it is the view of this author that precedent should not necessarily
support a power to deport aliens long resident in this country for acts either
which have no connection with their status upon arrival, or which are not
a grave threat to the political fabric of this country.' 6
THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE POWER TO DEPORT

In any historical discussion of the power to deport, it is necessary to
differentiate between exclusion and deportation. The former refers to the
ability to refuse entry to aliens seeking it. The second originally referred
to the ability to expel aliens who had entered either clandestinely, or fraudulently, but in either case had no right to be in the country. In more modern
times, its meaning has been enlarged until today the definition includes the
power to remove legally resident aliens because of acts done or status
acquired subsequent to entry and totally unrelated to their condition upon
7
entry.'
13. Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 191 Okla. 501, 504, 134 P.2d 976, 979
(1942).
14. In Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, Justice Jackson observed, "The Constitutional requirement of procedural due process derives from the same source as Congress'
power to legislate, and when applicable, permeates every valid enactment of that body."
339 U.S. 33, 49 (1950).
15. Procedural due process alone may be largely an illusory protection. As one
scholar has said, "[I1f the sole question that may be asked is whether the proper procedures were followed, it would-provided merely that the required forms were observedmake any law, however arbitrary, valid, and proceedings under it done by due process
of law." SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A TEXTBOOK 165 (1972).
16. The view that precedent does not establish a plenary deportation power over
aliens in all cases is not original with the author. For a more extensive analysis of the
prior cases, see Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully-Admitted Permanent
Resident Alien: The Pre-1917 Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 1578 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
Pre-1917 Cases]; Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully-Admitted Permanent
Resident Alien: The Post-1917 Cases, 69 YALE L.J. 261 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
Post-1917 Cases].
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1970), the statute under which the government attempted to deport Lieggi in the present case, allows narcotics or marijuana convictions
to serve as a ground for deportation no matter how long the period of .time between
the alien's entry into this country and his conviction. Theoretically, an alien who was
an infant upon entry could be deported for a conviction occurring in his old age if he
had not become a citizen in the interim.
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The power to exclude aliens has always been considered plenary. In
a recent case, Kleindienst v. Mandel,18 the Court said, "[Olver no conceivable
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the
admission of aliens."' 19 This breadth of power was based in an early case on a
"sovereign powers" concept, 20 but as one commentator has pointed out, 2'
this is arguably redundant, as the grant of power can be quite adequately
grounded on Congress' power over foreign commerce, treaties, war, and naturalization. Undeniably, the exclusion power is very extensive, and, as a survey
of early cases and statutes discloses, exclusion is the progenitor of the
modern concept of deportation.
The first deportation statute was based not on exclusion, but on the war
power.2 2 Under the Act of 1798,23 the President was empowered in time
of war to expel any alien who, in his opinion, was a threat to government
24
security.
After 1800, immigration was allowed to flow unrestricted until 1875
when the first exclusionary statute was passed, forbidding entry to convicts
and prostitutes.2 5 In 1891, a statute denying entry to idiots, insane persons,
and others was added. 26 This law was the basis for a statement by Justice
Gray in Ekiu v. United States 7 which indicated that the power to deport may
be implied from the power to exclude, "Every sovereign nation has power
. . . to forbid the entrance of foreigners. . . or to admit them only in such
cases and upon such conditions as it may deem fit."' 28 No deportation policy
of Congress existed at this time which was not based on exclusion.
The year 1882 saw the first exclusionary statute based on race.2 9 A
knowledge of the procedure created by the Act is important to an understanding of the later cases. The purpose of the statute was to deny entry to
18. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
19. Id. at 766, citing Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339

(1909).
20. "It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has
the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the
entrance of foreigners within its dominions .....
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,
142 U.S. 651 (1892).
21. Pre-1917 Cases, note 16 supra, at 1590-91.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
23. Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577.
24. A contemporaneous statute, Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, which
gave the President similar powers in peace-time, expired in 1801.
25. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477.
26. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084. The statute also excluded
those likely to become a public charge, those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, those suffering from a loathsome or contagious disease, polygamists, and contract
laborers.
27. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
28. Id. at 659.
29. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, as amended Act of May 5, 1892,
ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25.
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Chinese laborers. To guard against illegal entry, all Chinese already residents
were required to obtain "certificates of residence" from the proper government
official. A Chinese citizen found in the country without this certificate was
presumed to have entered illegally. This presumption could be rebutted by
other evidence. 30 With the foregoing as background, an opinion was written
which, even today, is cited as an initial delineation of deportation as a plenary
power, 31 Fong Yue Ting v. United States.3 2 The plaintiffs in Fong Yue
Ting were three Chinese who were discovered without the proper certificates
and had been ordered expelled. Although the actual issue before the court,
the validity of the procedures employed which served to shift to petitioners
the burden on the issue of the right to remain, was narrow, Justice Gray wrote
an expansive opinion, holding that the procedures contained in the statute
did not offend procedural due process and were not an invalid delegation of
power. 3 3 The holding has proved relatively unimportant. Dicta found in
the case, however, has been quoted often in later cases. Justice Gray wrote:
The power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting
international relations, is vested in the political departments of the
government, and is to be regulated by treaty, or by Act of Congress, and to be executed by the Executive authority according to
the regulations so established, except so far as the judicial department has been authorized by treaty, or by statute, or is required
by the paramount law of the Constitution, to intervene. .... 34
On examination, this passage does not in fact recognize a plenary congressional power to deport. Deportation (expulsion) here was a tool by which
Congress provided for removal of aliens who were presumed to have entered
illegally, or, in other words, exercised its plenary power of exclusion.3 5 One
commentator, writing in 1959, said of this decision, "Fong Yue Ting did

not, as seems to have been assumed in recent cases, abrogate the need for
Congress to find a rational nexus between proscribed conduct and the regulation of immigration before declaring an act expellable."36
Thus the constitutionally-delegated basis for Congress' power to -remove
resident aliens in Fong Yue Ting was its authority over foreign commerce,
the basis for its power to refuse aliens admittance. This link, if followed
through later cases, becomes more tenuous. Some grounds for deportation
37
today are not necessarily related to the status of the alien on entry.
30. Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 6, 23 Stat. 115.
31. In fact, the Lieggi court cited Fong Yue Ting as applicable precedent. Lieggi
v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 389 F. Supp. 12, 16 (N.D. Ill.
1975).
32. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
33. Id. at 732.
34. ld. at 713.
35. Justice Jackson, writing for the Court in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, noted that
"until the turn of the century expulsion was used only as an auxiliary remedy to enforce
exclusion." 342 U.S. 580, 588 n.15 (1951).
36. Pre-1917 Cases, note 16 supra, at 1596-97.
37. See note 17 supra.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

A 1913 case, Bugajewitz v. Adams,3 8 is another opinion frequently
mentioned as a major support for a plenary power to deport. Bugajewitz
dealt with a statute which excluded aliens who were prostitutes.3 9 Because
of the difficulty in ascertaining who were prostitutes and who were not, the
statute provided that an alien practicing prostitution subsequent to entry
would be deemed to have practiced it previously, and thus to have entered
illegally. Here again, ,the power to deport was used as an instrument to
implement the power to exclude. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court,
appeared to have something more in mind when he said: "It is thoroughly
established that Congress has power to order the deportation of aliens whose
presence in the country it deems hurtful."' 40 The word "deportation" had not
attained the connotations in 1913 that it possesses today, however, and Justice Holmes' dissent in a case decided four years earlier, Keller v. United
States,4 1 makes it very doubtful that he was speaking for a totally unbridled
power to deport in Bugajewitz:
For the purpose of excluding those who unlawfully enter this
country, Congress has power to retain control over aliens long
enough to make sure of the facts. . . . To this end, it may make
their admission conditional for three years. . . . If the ground of
exclusion is their calling, practice of it within a short time after
arrival is or may be made evidence of what it was when they came
in... and, while a period of three years seems to be long, I am not
42
prepared to say, against the judgment of Congress, it is too long.
While the last sentence above can arguably be said to be an acknowledgement of Congress' authority in the matter, the phrase "long enough to make
sure of the facts" indicates that Justice Holmes would not accept such a statute with no time limits whatsoever. Also, the object of the statement is again
deportation as a tool of the expulsion power. In summary, Bugajewitz is an
unsure precedent upon which to base current theories of unlimited deporta43
tion power.
The Act of 191744 was the first to discard a provision found in all previous legislation, that aliens committing certain acts within certain time
periods were thereby deemed to have entered the country illegally. One
scholar has pointed out that by this statute: "Congress denied that a causal
connection between pre-entry characteristics and post-entry conduct was
38.

228 U.S. 585 (1913).

39. Act of February 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898, as amended Act of March
26, 1910, ch. 128, 36 Stat. 265.
40. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. at 592 (1913).
41. 213 U.S. 138 (1909).
42. Id. at 150.
43. Hesse, noting that Justice Holmes' opinion in Bugajewitz has been read as allowing deportation for acts committed after entry, argued that the opinion, when read
with the dissent in Keller, "indicated that [Holmes] assumed the presence of an erroneously admitted alien [in Bugajewitz]." Pre-1917 Cases, note 16, supra, at 1625.
44. Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874.
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necessarily relevant to the exercise of the [deportation] power, and, accordingly, actually divorced ejectment from excludability . . . as a consequence,
time limitation periods became accepted as the boundaries of the govern' 45
ment's grace, rather than the extent of its powers."
Once this partition between exclusion and deportation was accomplished,
a wholly separate deportation power found root, fostered by increasingly
expansive drafting by Congress. By ridding statutes of any time limitations,
Congress was able to extend its power over aliens for longer periods of time.
Today, an alien who has taken no steps toward naturalization can be
deported upon doing certain acts no matter how long he has been a resident,
46
and for reasons that have no connection to his status upon entry.
While the historical legitimacy of a plenary power of Congress to decide
the grounds on which legally-resident aliens are to be deported is thus in
question, the courts have not doubted its validity, no matter how unfair or
arbitrary the statute before them might appear. In three cases in the early
1950's, the Supreme Court considered deportation statutes against which the
petitioners had raised substantive due process arguments, and refused to
apply the asserted fifth amendment due process tests.
The 1950's Cases
All three cases have a common factual attribute, the status for which
the petitioners were being deported was Communist Party membership. In
the first, Carlson v. Landon,47 Justice Reed, writing for the Court, and citing
Ekiu, Fong Yue Ting, and Bugajewitz, couched the power of Congress in the
most expansive language used in an opinion until that time:
So long . . . as aliens fail to obtain and maintain citizenship by
naturalization, they remain subject to the plenary power of Congress to expel them under the sovereign right to determine
4 8 what
noncitizens shall be permitted to remain within our borders.
It is questionable whether close examination of the three cases cited
support the statement of Justice Reed. Moreover, later in his opinion, he
stated that the threat of Communism is such that Congress would be within
its power to deport the petitioners, "according to any theory of reasonableness
or arbitrariness. '49 The implication of this statement is, that for Justice Reed
at least, due process would have been satisfied if applied. That due process
should apply would appear to be the import of a statement found still later,
"The power [to expel] is, of course, subject to judicial intervention under
45. Post-1917 Cases, note 16 supra, at 264.
46. See note 17 supra.
47. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
48. Id. at 534, citing Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913); Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
49. 342 U.S. at 536.
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the 'paramount law of the Constitution.' "50 As authority for this statement,
Reed again cited Fong Yue Ting. Justice Reed's third statement is very difficult to reconcile with his first, for a truly sovereign or plenary power is not
limited by judicial review. It has no limits by definition. No matter what
the meaning of Justice Reed's opinion, the resut was the same. The statute
was sustained, and the alien was deported.
The second of these cases, Harisiades v. Shaugnessy,51 is probably the
most often cited of the three. Again the Court, through Justice Jackson, was
asked to find that deportation was not reasonably related to a valid exercise of
congressional power and again the Court refused, basing its refusal on a
denotation of deportation as a "sovereign" power: "That aliens remain vulnerable to expulsion after long residence is a practice that bristles with severities. But it is a weapon of defense and reprisal confirmed by international
law as a power inherent in every sovereign state."'5 2 And in connection with
political considerations the Court observed, "[A]ny policy towards aliens is
vitally interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of
foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form
of government. ' 53 In Harisiades,each of the three petitioners had resided
in the country for approximately thirty years, and had ended their Communist
Party membership before such affiliation became grounds for deportation. 54
Although the facts made application of the plenary power doctrine particularly harsh, the Court found that the petitioners were nevertheless vulnerable
to deportation.
The third case in the series, Galvan v. Press,55 was decided three years
later and its holding is basically little more than a restatement of the position
of the first two. The case is significant for what may be a note of hesitation
in the opinion of Justice Frankfurter:
In light of the expansion of the concept of substantive due process
as a limitation upon the powers of Congress, even the war power,
much could be said for the view, were we writing on a clean slate,
that the due process clause qualifies the scope of political discretion heretofore recognized as belonging to Congress in regulating
56
the entry and deportation of aliens . . . but the slate is not clean.
While the result for the alien petitioners in Galvan was the same as in the
two previous cases--deportation-the above passage is important because it
underscores what was for the Court in Carlson, Harisiades, and Galvan, the
basic rationale for finding deportation legislation immune to the tests of sub50. Id. at 537.
51. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
52. Id. at 587-88.

53. id. at 588-89.
54. Ex post facto considerations were found not to apply because deportation is
a civil and not criminal proceeding. Id. at 594.
55. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).

56. Id. at 530-31.
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stantive due process, that Congress in finding it necessary to expel avowed
Communists was acting on the basis of considerations which were uniquely
the concern of Congress, because they were rooted in the concept of "national
sovereignty." Although this concept is never clearly defined, it includes
powers, recognized at international law, of which every sovereign nation can
make use to defend itself. It is a principle of international law, that inherent
57
in national sovereignty, is the power summarily to expel resident aliens.
Justice Gray at one point in Fong Yue Ting based the power to exclude
aliens on national sovereignty. 58 However, in that case, the concept of sovereignty became less important, since Justice Gray also enumerated express
grants of constitutional power, most notably the power to regulate foreign
commerce which legitimized the exclusion policy of Congress. When it is the
alien, long a resident of the United States, who is the subject of a deportation
order, it can no longer be realistically argued that deportation is only an
extension of the power to exclude, and thus the basis for its exercise in those
contexts falls away. Therefore, in the Harisiades triology, the Court,
although it never specifically used the term "political question," clearly
treated the substantive due process issue as non-justiciable. At one point in
the Court's opinion in Harisiades, Justice Jackson said, "Such matters are so
exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely
immune from judicial inquiry or interference. Certainly, however, nothing
in the structure of our government or the text of our Constitution would warrant judicial review by standards which would require us to equate our political judgment with that of Congress.!" 9 One commentator has called this
concept of national sovereignty, or political question, "the highest barrier to a
fresh consideration of the long-term resident alien's status . . . [in relation
to deportation]." 60 That the view of deportation as a function of sovereignty
forecloses judicial review in all cases does not necessarily follow. As noted
previously, the courts have already extended their influence to the extent of
requiring procedural due process. It remains unexplained why the sovereign
powers concept which is only implied in the Constitution is superior to the
express limitation of the due process clause.
The preceding overview is not intended as an exhaustive survey of
precedent in the area of deportation, but is instead an attempt to delineate
the origins of the major sources of the plenary power concept, exclusion, and,
alternatively, national sovereignty. The cases discussed above form the basis
of current opinions in the area. 6 ' It would be misleading, however, if after
57. See_.RIYNE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 114-16 (1971).
58. 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893).
59. 342 U.S. at 589-90.
60. Pre-1917 Cases, note 16 supra, at 1586.
61. See Santelises v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 491 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1975); Bufalino v. Immigration and Naturalization
Serv., 473 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1974); Ah Chiu Pang
v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 368 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
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defining the sources of the power, mention was not made of the present
position of the Supreme Court. The Court has upheld every deportation statute it has examined since 1954, no matter how tenuous the link between the
statute and the alien's status on entry, or to the political considerations com62
prised by national sovereignty. This is illustrated by Marcello v. Bonds
where petitioner was to be deported because of his conviction under the Marijuana Tax Act. 63 Marcello argued that his deportation was improper for two
reasons: that the deportation proceedings were invalid on procedural due
process grounds, and that deportation would be violative of the ex post facto
clause, since his conviction occurred before such conviction was made grounds
for deportation. The first issue is unimportant for present purposes. In raising the second issue, however, petitioner argued that deportation was in fact
punishment within the ex post facto provision, an argument which contradicted the Court's holding in Harisiades. In that case, the Court held that
deportation was a civil proceeding, and thus protections which would apply
in criminal proceedings were not necessary. Notably, although the political
considerations which figured prominently in the Court's decision in Carlson,
Harisiades, and Galvan were not apparent in Marcello, the Court refused to
differentiate, and held that the rule in those cases was applicable in Marcello:
"We perceive no special reasons, however, for over-turning our precedents
'64
in this matter, and adhere to our [prior] decisions."
On the basis of this view of precedent, it can be seen that while
deportation began as an extension of the exclusion power, it has attained a
vitality of its own through an application of the concept of national sovereignty. The plenary power which results from these cases would apparently
allow Congress to define any act or status of an alien as grounds for deportation, no matter how arbitrary or unreasonable, and the Courts could not find
the legislation invalid.
DEPORTATION AS A CIVIL PROCEEDING

The view of the deportation power as plenary has led the courts to hold
that deportation proceedings are civil and not criminal in nature, and therefore no punishment results. Basically, this is a recognition of the rationale
stated by Chief Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles: 5
In deciding whether or not a law is penal, this Court has generally
based its determination upon the purposes of the statute. If the
U.S. 1037 (1967); Burr v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 350 F.2d 87 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 915 (1966); United States ex rel. Circella v. Sahli, 216
F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 914 (1955).
62. 349 U.S. 302 (1955).

63.

INT. REV. CODE OF

64. 349 U.S. at 314.
65. 356 U.S. 86 (1958)
desertion in war-time).

1954, § 4744.
(Dealt with issue of denaturalization as punishment for
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statute imposes a disability for the purpose of punishment-that is,
to reprimand the wrong-doer, to deter others, etc., it has been considered penal. But a statute has been considered non-penal if it
imposes a disability, not to punish but to accomplish some other
legitimate governmental purpose. 66
In the past, the Court has found that the purpose of deportation statutes was
to aid either in excluding aliens, as in Fong Yue Ting, or in removing those
aliens who posed a threat to national sovereignty. Thus, deportation has
never been considered punishment.
This is not to say, however, that there has been judicial unanimity on
the punishment issue. Various jurists have long asserted that, on the basis
of the damage caused, deportation should be considered punishment, and the
more stringent procedural standards required by the Constitution in criminal
trials should be imposed. 67 In 1947, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court
in Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan6s and explaining the necessity for construing
deportation statutes strictly against the government, observed: "[Deportation] is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a
forfeiture is a penalty." 69 Nevertheless, this view has never formed the basis
of an opinion, until, Lieggi v. United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service.
THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION

Andrea Lieggi, born in Italy in 1947, was brought to the United States
by his father in 1963. Three years later Andrea's mother and sister arrived,
and the family settled in Chicago, where Andrea attended school. Andrea
left school before graduation and found employment. In September of 1968,
Andrea left home and moved to California. Soon after, he was arrested for
selling three marijuana cigarettes to his roommate. In April of 1969, he pled
guilty to the charge of "willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously selling, furnishing, or giving away a narcotic, to wit, marijuana." 70 Having spent sixty-nine
days in jail before his plea, Andrea was sentenced to three years probation,
and was allowed to return to Chicago and rejoin his family. Andrea unsuccessfully instituted appeals in the California Appellate and Supreme Courts.
Soon after his return to Chicago, an order to show cause and notice of hearing
was issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, charging that
because of Andrea's conviction, he was subject to deportation under section
1251 (a) (11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 71 A hearing was held
66. Id. at 96.
67. See, e.g., Jordan v. Degeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting);
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1921) (Brandeis, J.); DiPasquale v. Kannuth, 158
F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.).
68. 333 U.S. 6 (1947).
69. Id. at 10.
70. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11531 (West 1971).
71. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970). § 1251 states in part:
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on January 15, 1970, at which Andrea was represented by counsel.

March 7, the Special Inquiry Officer ordered Andrea's deportation.

On

Andrea

attempted to re-open the proceedings; however, all administrative appeals
failed. 72 On June 14, 1974, Lieggi filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
The petition presented four main issues: 1) Whether the court had
jurisdiction over the matter through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus;

2) whether Lieggi's California conviction was valid; 3) whether deportation
would violate Lieggi's due process rights; and 4) whether deportation

amounts to cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment. The
court decided the first issue in favor of Lieggi and refused to hear evidence
on the second.

73

The court began its consideration of the third issue by recognizing that

previous courts had denied aliens constitutional rights in deportation proceedings, without mentioning that procedural due process is necessary. 74 Nevertheless, the court made it clear that criminal standards of due process should
be required, characterizing the holding of prior courts that deportation is not
punishment as "fundamentally unbelievable," and asking, "How can deporta-

tion be considered anything but punishment? In this case petitioner stood
to lose his residence, livelihood, and, most importantly, his family. Certainly
if the same thing occurred to a United States Citizen a court would not
hesitate to call it punishment-moreover, cruel and unusual punishment. ' 75
Therefore, the core of the court's argument was that deportation must be
punishment because it injures the alien involved, and because it would be
76
considered punishment if it were imposed upon a citizen.

(a) Any alien in the United States . . . shall, upon order of the AttorneyGeneral, be deported who(11)

is or hereafter at any time after entry . . . has been convicted of
a violation of . . . any law or regulation governing or controlling
the. . sale . . . of marihuana ....
72. Lieggi attempted to reopen the proceedings under section 1253(h) of the Act
which would defer deportation, if the alien could show that he would be persecuted in
the country of his destination because of his race, religion, or political opinions.
73. With reference to the first issue, the government argued that since Lieggi was
not in actual custody at the time of his petition, jurisdiction was not in the court to
grant the writ. The court answered that actual custody was not required, but only a
restraint on liberty, citing Jung Woon Kay v. Carr, 88 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1937); United
States ex rel. Wirtz v. Sheehan, 319 F. Supp. 146 (E.D. Wis. 1970). As to the second,
the court found itself without jurisdiction to hear a collateral attack of issues that should
have been raised on direct appeal. Lieggi v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 389 F. Supp. at 15-16.
74. See cases cited note 12 supra.
75. Lieggi v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 389 F. Supp. at
17.
76. To say deportation is punishment without more is to beg the question. As has
been pointed out in notes 65, 66 supra, and accompanying text, harm which results from
a valid non-penal exercise of power is not punishment, and only upon a finding that
no reasonable relation to such power exists, can the power be found penal. Impliedly
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Upon finding that deportation in fact constitutes punishment, the court
cited three recent Supreme Court opinions which indicate that aliens are currently looked upon by that Court with more favor than in the past. The
first, Graham v. Richardson,77 was decided in 1971, and ruled that "[c]lassifications on the basis of alienage are inherently suspect and are therefore subject to strict judicial scrutiny whether or not a fundamental right is impaired." 78s The state statutes at issue in Graham denied welfare benefits to
aliens. The second, In re Grifliths,79 struck down a rule of the Connecticut
State Bar which limited admittance to the practice of law to citizens. The
last, Sugarman v. Dougall,8 0 voided a New York law which limited employment in the civil service to citizens.
In referring to these decisions, the court recognized that, since equal
protection was a concept found only in the fourteenth amendment, it did not
operate directly as a limitation on the federal government, but pointed out,
"If . . . alienage is a suspect criterion under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment, then the federal government must adhere to the
same standard as do the states.""' The core of the court's equal protection
analysis is found in the next paragraph of its opinion:
If equal protection is to have any real application to a resident
alien, surely it has to mean that an alien cannot be deprived of
his Constitutional rights when involved in a deportation proceeding.
Under the new decisions a state may not bar aliens from welfare
benefits, from state employment or from becoming members of the
professions. Yet, if the plenary power of Congress theory is followed, the Federal government can totally abridge all the Constitutional protections 8 and
safeguards that a legal resident alien is
2
supposed to enjoy.
While the last sentence is somewhat misleading, in that the alien is not totally
unprotected in the deportation setting,8 3 the fact remains that a plenary
deportation power has meant just that to aliens in the past.8 4 Although
the court found deportation in this context unrelated; it is crucial that it did, for, if not,
the remainder of the opinion is unsound.
77. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
78. Id. at 372.
79. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
80. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
81. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954), found the due process clause of
the fifth amendment to include the equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth.
82. Lieggi v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv. at 18.
83. See notes 12, 14 supra.
84. This power has had harsh results in the past. For example, in Abel v. United
States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), Abel was arrested on an administrative warrant and held
without bail for deportation. While in detention, he was arrested on criminal charges
of conspiracy to commit espionage. The charge was based on forged documents found
in Abel's possession by immigration authorities during a warrantless search. Admission
of the documents was upheld at trial. For other cases holding that criminal due process
standards do not attach, because no punishment is inflicted, see Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226

U.S. 272

(1922); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1921); Bugajewitz v. Adams,
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unstated, the basic holding of the court must be seen as a rejection of the
plenary power concept. Accepting this, the court's equal protection argument is arguably superfluous. The concept of a plenary deportation power
has been considered valid in the past because of a nexus to political questions
which the courts, because of the concept of justiciability, were precluded from
entering. The Lieggi court, on the other hand, implied that no rational relationship exists as far as this provision is concerned, between the particular
statute involved and the political considerations of Congress. Therefore, the
Lieggi court held that equal protection required the imposition of criminal
due process standards if no compelling interest could be shown: "Such standards would at least require right of counsel at all significant stages, a presumption of innocence, a right to bail, freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment, etc." 8 5
In discussing Lieggi's contention that to deport him would be cruel and
unusual punishment, the court stressed the particular hardships Lieggi and
his family would undergo, if he was returned to Italy,8 6 and the relative insignificance of his offense. The court cited published studies, including one by
the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug abuse8 7 which concluded
that private possession 88 of marijuana should not be a criminal offense, to
support the proposition that deportation was an overly-severe response to
Lieggi's act. In finding deportation cruel and unusual, the court ruled that
deportation in this instance was excessive in length and severity, and out of
all proportion to the offense charged, and granted Lieggi's release. It should
be noted that in granting the writ, the court underscored the weight of the
cases on the other side of the issue, but said that granting Lieggi's petition
was necessary to avoid an inequitable result, and pointed out, "[t]he recent
developments in this once dormant area of the law, [and] the change in legal
and social attitudes toward violations of the marijuana laws . . . make the

deportation a rather acrimonious act under out contemporary standards of
228 U.S. 585 (1913); Fok Yong Wo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296 (1902); cases cited

note 61 supra.

85. Lieggi v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 389 F. Supp. at
19. As mentioned in note 10 supra, privately retained counsel is already allowed by
statute. However, the court's opinion would conceivably call for appointed counsel for
the indigent, in line with the rule promulgated by the Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Also, since any deportation order must be based on reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence, the alien in a deportation proceeding already has the advantage of a presumption of innocence, although it is not equal to the
reasonable doubt standard required at criminal trials.
86. It is evident from the tenor of the court's opinion that sympathy for Lieggi
played an important role in its decision: "Indeed this court would be very reluctant to
assess this question [cruel and unusual punishment] were it not for the peculiar factual
situation in this case." Lieggi v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,
389 F. Supp. at 19.
87. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIJUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, FIRST COMMISSION
REPORT 154, n.1 (1970).
88.

It should be noted that Lieggi was convicted of the sale of marijuana, not its

possession.

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

decency and equality."8 9 It can be argued that the court, in deciding Lieggi,
was more concerned with the harshness of deporting the petitioner, than with
writing an opinion which would serve as the basis for a new view of the law
in the area of deportation. Although this may be true, the factors pointed
to by the court may indeed serve as the basis for such a view.
The next section of this comment will contrast the court's opinion in
Lieggi with the prior case law and forecast the treatment the case will receive
when considered by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
DEPORTATION AS PUNISHMENT

The facts surrounding Andrea Lieggi's conviction and the hardships
deportation would cause him and his family underscore the reasons why some
have long argued for effective judicial recognition of deportation as punishment.90 Except for his marijuana conviction, Lieggi had no criminal record.
He had never been arrested on any other charge. At the time of his hearing,
he was employed, and was the sole support of his parents and sister, who
are American citizens. Nevertheless, the federal government proposed to
uproot him and send him to Italy, where, according to his testimony, he knew
no one. He and his family would have suffered enormously. To impede
this harm, the court in Lieggi has fashioned an opinion containing three
separate holdings: 1) to deport an alien is to punish him; 2) to deport an
alien without affording him the criminal procedural safeguards guaranteed
him by the Constitution offends his right to equal protection, since a citizen
faced with the same punishment would be guaranteed such protections; and
3) that deportation in the case of Andrea Lieggi is cruel and unusual punishment.
While it is true that the Lieggi court stressed an equal protection
analysis, and only commented that, because of the harm done, deportation
must be punishment, the holding that deportation is penal is the most
important of the opinion, and the one on which the validity of the remainder
rests. No prior opinion has found deportation to be punishment, because the
power to decide grounds for deportation has been considered plenary, that
is, based on considerations and issues that the Constitution has reserved to
Congress, not intending that the courts interject their view of the reasonableness of the policy promulgated. To say that the removal of an alien is
punishment is to say that the deportation policy in question has no reasonable
relation to any valid exercise of the power of Congress. In other words it
is to apply the tests of substantive due process, and in so doing, deny the
plenary nature of the power. Substantive due process is a phrase which
cannot be found in Lieggi. To not discuss it begs the question, however,
for if Congress has a valid purpose in sending Lieggi to Italy other than to
89. Lieggi v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 389 F. Supp. at
21.
90. See Bullitt, Deportation as a Denial of Substantive Due Process, 8 WASH. L
REv. 205 (1953); Mancini, Deportation as Cruel and Unusual Punishment After Fur-
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penalize him for an illegal act, the sending cannot be punishment, no matter
how much harm is caused. 91 To investigate the purpose of Congress is
impossible if the power exercised is plenary. Thus, the Lieggi court, in finding deportation punishment, has assaulted the basic nature of the deportation
power.
The statute under which the Immigration and Naturalization Service
attempted to deport Lieggi differs from most of the other expellable classes
delineated by Congress. The others, for the most part,92 fall into one of two
categories: either the act or status of the alien which will precipitate deportation must have occurred within a fixed period of time, usually five years
from the entry of the alien into this country, or it must be evident that the
alien is a political dissident whose presence threatens the federal government. 93 The former class can arguably be justified as the modern counterpart of the exclusion statute found valid in Ekiu v. United States. 4 The
latter represents the same policies upheld in Harisiades,95 Carlson,9 6 and
Galvan97 in the 1950's. Section 1251(a)(11), 98 on the other hand, calls for
deportation of any alien, who "at any time" after entry is found to be a narcotics addict, or to have violated a narcotics statute. Therefore, the alternative rationales which the Supreme Court has used to justify a plenary
deportation power, deportation as an arm of the power to exclude, or as a
weapon wielded by the government to defend itself, do not seem to apply to
this particular policy.
Whether this discrepancy is what moved the district court in Lieggi to
break with precedent and find deportation punishment must remain open to
speculation, however, since this holding was set out in very conclusionary
terms-that since the harm caused the individual would be great, deportation
must be punishment. This analysis, alone, is unsatisfactory, since prior courts
have allowed deportation to proceed in cases where the result was more
inequitable than in the present case.99 Conversely, this holding is crucial to

man v. Georgia, 3 U. SAN FFRNANDO VALLEY L. REV. 27 (1974); Maslow, Recasting
Our Deportation Law; Proposals for Reform, 56 CoL. L. REV. 309 (1956); Note, Immigration, Aliens, and the Constitution, 49 N.D. LAWYER 1075 (1974); Comment, 20 U.
CH. L. REV. 547 (1953); Note, 8 VILL. L. REV. 566 (1963); material cited note 67
supra.
91. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).

92. Other classes which have no time limit include: aliens who are managers of
houses of prostitution; those convicted of possessing a sawed-off shotgun or automatic
weapon; and those convicted more than once of violating alien registration laws. 8
U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(12), (13), (16) (1970).
93. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6), (7) (1970).
94.

142 U.S. 651 (1892).

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

342 U.S. 580 (1952).
342 U.S. 524 (1952).
347 U.S. 522 (1954).
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1970).
See, e.g., Harisiades V.Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
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the remainder of the opinion, for punishment cannot be found cruel and
unusual until it is first found to be punishment. Therefore, if the district
court opinion is to have relevance to future deportation cases, the preliminary
holding that deportation is punishment must be seen as based upon a finding
that the statute in question violates substantive due process in that it is not
rationally related to a power of Congress, other than that of punishment of
individuals for illegal acts.
The next section of the opinion, dealing with the lack of criminal due
process safeguards in the deportation setting as a violation of equal protection, is misleading. Since a federal statute was in question in Lieggi, the
equal protection standards of the fourteenth amendment can have no application, at least directly. Instead, the Supreme Court in Boiling v. Sharpe'0 0
has held, "We do not imply that the two [equal protection and due process]
are always interchangeable phrases. But . . . discrimination may be so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process."'' 1 When a federal statute
is in question then, it is the fifth amendment due process concept of fairness
against which the statute must be measured. Arguably, in Lieggi, mention
of equal protection is unnecessary, and the statute could instead be looked
upon as violating Lieggi's rights, in that he was punished in a proceeding in
which he was not accorded those protections made necessary by the Constitution in a criminal trial. The court recognized by implication that an equal
protection analysis is not crucial to a resolution of the case when it said,
"[O]bviously, none of these cases [Graham,'0 2 Sugarman,10 3 and Grilliths'04 ]
could be cited as controlling precedent to the problem that is currently before
the court."' 0 5 The court noted, however, that equal protection standards are
incorporated in fifth amendment due process.
In delineating the actual safeguards which would be required in future
deportation proceedings, the court did not set out an exhaustive list, but said
that "at least counsel at all significant stages, some form of judicial approval
of searches, a presumption of innocence, a right to bail, and freedom from
cruel and unusual punishment are necessary."'10 6 It is interesting to note
that, of this list, Lieggi was allowed counsel at his deportation hearing by
statute, that no search was made, and that no bail was required since Lieggi
was not in custody. As for the presumption of innocence, there is a specific
burden of proof which the government is required by statute to meet in
deportation cases. The court could not point to any violations of the stand100. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
101. Id. at 499.
102. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
103. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
104. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).

105. Lieggi v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 389 F. Supp. at
106. Id. at 19.
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ards it had promulgated in Lieggi's case, except for cruel and unusual
punishment.
Opinions previous to Lieggi are unanimous in holding that deportation
is not punishment, and so cannot be cruel and unusual. Courts faced with
the issue most often respond with language resembling that found in Bufalino
v. Immigration and Naturalization Service: 0 7 "Despite the serious consequences of deportation, deportation statutes are not penal in nature. . . petitioner's argument that his deportation would constitute cruel and unusual
punishment is also without merit."' 08 The point at which Lieggi departs from
prior cases, however, is not whether deportation is cruel and unusual punishment, but whether it is punishment in any sense. For this reason, prior cases
did not in reality reach the eighth amendment issue. Since no prior court
has found deportation to be punishment, this second issue is one of first
impression.
The finding of the court that deportation in Lieggi's case would
constitute cruel and unusual punishment was based on the view that, "the
eighth amendment draws its meaning from the evolving standards of a maturing society," and "that punishments which are excessive in length or severity
to the offenses charged may not be imposed." For the former, the court cited

0
Trop v. Dulles,10 9 and for the latter, Furman v. Georgia,"1
and Robinson
v. California.'"Although nine separate opinions were written in Furman, cri-

teria for a finding of cruel and unusual punishment can be gleaned from
the opinion. Justice Douglas spoke of arbitrary application of the penalty, 1 2 and Justice Brennan created a cumulative test which included
such factors as unusually severe punishment, arbitrary application of the
punishment, a rejection of the punishment by contemporary society, and the
absence of a showing that the punishment serves a penal purpose more
effectively than a less severe punishment." 83
Although arbitrary infliction of punishment played an important part in
the finding that the death penalty was cruel and unusual in Furman, the court
in Lieggi did not examine the facts surrounding Lieggi's deportation to ascertain whether arbitrariness existed in his case. Instead, the court found that
deportation was a disproportionate punishment when weighed against the
crime Lieggi had committed, basing its finding on a report of a national commission which found marijuana harmless, and also on statutes in various
states which had decreased penalties for marijuana convictions."1 4 The court
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

473 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 739.
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
370 U.S. 660 (1962).

112. 408 U.S. at 351.
113. Id. at 374.
114. 389 F. Supp. at 20.
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balanced these facts against the injury deportation would cause Lieggi and
ruled that, on the basis of the facts present, deportation was violative of the
eighth amendment.
Although the court did not establish every factor set out in Justice
Brennan's opinion in Furman, cruel and unusual punishment was established
on the facts of the case. To remove Lieggi from his family and to send him
to a country in which he has not been for twelve years is totally disproportionate to the crime which he committed. It should be noted, however, that
the holding of the case is based on the particular facts found in Lieggi. Since
by the test utilized in the opinion it is disproportionate punishment which is
invalid, application of Lieggi in succeeding cases, if the decision is affirmed
on appeal, will of necessity occur on a case by case basis. The eighth amendment analysis found in the case may be of secondary importance in the
future. For in finding deportation to be punishment, the court has provided
the basis for what may be a significant enlargement of aliens' rights in the
deportation context, by calling into question the plenary power of Congress.
CONCLUSION

Early in 1976, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals will likely render
its decision in Lieggi. Although an examination of precedent makes a reversal of the district court decision appear likely, three factors militate for its
affirmance. First, prior Supreme Court decisions do not stand for the
propostion that deportation statutes will be excepted from the standards of
substantive due process when the statute in question is not reasonably related
to the exclusion power or to political considerations. Second, the statute in
Lieggi is not so related. Third, recent Supreme Court decisions in Sugarman
v. Dougall, In re Griffiths, and Graham v. Richardson signal a move by the
Court supporting equal treatment of resident aliens and citizens in as many
cases as possible.
Lieggi is important because it is time that the arbitrary power of
Congress to erect deportation categories be ended. A mid-seventies case,
Lieggi, defines the issues clearly, free from the fears engendered by
Communism in the 1950's or the massive immigration of earlier years. That
the civil status of the deportation power is illogical has been pointed out many
times. The passage below is no less true than when it was written in 1959:
This [recognition that deportation is punishment] would give the
alien the rights which the Constitution accords to "persons" ending
the anomalous practice of protecting his property, while allowing
the residence on which his life and liberty may truly be said to
depend to be taken away at the government's will. 115
This "anomalous practice" has continued for another sixteen years; perhaps
Lieggi will finally bring it to an end.
ROBERT NOLAN

115. Post-1917 Cases, note 16 supra, at 295.

